Criminal Law - The  No I Didn\u27t, and Yes I Did But....  Defense: Is the Entrapment Defense Available to Criminal Defendants Who Deny Doing the Crime? - Mathews v. United States by Hicks, George Robert, III
Campbell Law Review
Volume 11
Issue 2 Spring 1989 Article 6
January 1989
Criminal Law - The "No I Didn't, and Yes I Did
But...." Defense: Is the Entrapment Defense
Available to Criminal Defendants Who Deny
Doing the Crime? - Mathews v. United States
George Robert Hicks III
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
George Robert Hicks III, Criminal Law - The "No I Didn't, and Yes I Did But...." Defense: Is the Entrapment Defense Available to Criminal
Defendants Who Deny Doing the Crime? - Mathews v. United States, 11 Campbell L. Rev. 279 (1989).
CRIMINAL LAW-THE "NO I DIDN'T, AND YES I DID
BUT.. ." DEFENSE: IS THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
AVAILABLE TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS WHO DENY DO-
ING THE CRIME?-Mathews v. United States
INTRODUCTION
"In these mean and cynical times when criminal defense work
is not a lot of fun, this decision is like a fresh light of sunshine on a
dark and cloudy day."' These words from Franklin Gimbel, the de-
fendant's attorney, obviously reflect his pleasure with the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. United States.' He
may, however, be in a small group of pleased individuals and
institutions.
Before the Mathews decision, a vast majority of the federal
courts of appeals had taken the view that a criminal defendant
could not deny commission of the acts charged and still avail him-
self of the entrapment defense.' The courts reasoned that an unac-
ceptable inconsistency exists when a defendant attempts to deny
the charged acts and simultaneously plead entrapment." Addition-
ally, the courts reasoned that the truth-finding function of criminal
trials compelled either the adoption or the continued existence of
the majority rule.5 Presently, a majority of the state courts share
this same view of the defense.' Because of the Mathews decision,
the federal courts must apply what was once the minority view at
the federal level and what remains the minority rule in the state
courts. Though state courts are free to choose either position,7
adoption of the Mathews rule leaves our federal courts undivided
on the issue, thus affording criminal defendants in the federal sys-
tem the "No I didn't, and yes I did but . . ." defense where the
facts allow.
1. Stewart, Reconsidering Rehnquist, 74 A.B.A. J. 40, 42 (1988).
2. 108 S. Ct. 883 (1988).
3. See infra notes 89-161 and accompanying text.
4. See United States v. Dorta, 783 F.2d 1179, 1181 (4th Cir. 1986); Munroe v.
United States, 424 F.2d 243, 244 (10th Cir. 1970).
5. See Dorta, 783 F.2d at 1181-82; United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161,
1168 (11th Cir. 1985).
6. See infra note 238.
7. Id.
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This Note will explore the history of the entrapment defense.
In addition, this Note will review previous federal court decisions
regarding the inconsistency rule. The inconsistency rule refuses a
criminal defendant the right to deny committing the charged acts
and plead the entrapment defense. This Note will analyze both the
majority and dissenting opinions of Mathews. The Note concludes
by urging the North Carolina courts to follow the Mathews lead
and change its stance with regard to the inconsistency rule.
THE CASE
In 1985, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested
Mathews, defendant-petitioner, and charged him with violating a
federal statute that prohibits public officials from accepting
bribes." At that time, Mathews worked for the Small Business Ad-
ministration (SBA) in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where he ran the
SBA's "8A Program"." The SBA established the program to assist
small businesses by subcontracting government contracts to those
who participated in the program."0
Prior to October 1984, Mathews had requested loans of money
from DeShayer, President of Midwest Knitting Mills, a participat-
ing company in the program." In October 1984, DeShayer believed
that because he had not made the loans to Mathews, Midwest had
not been provided with the program's benefits.' 2 Because of
DeShayer's complaint, the FBI began an investigation of Mathews
with DeShayer's assistance.' 3 DeShayer, while under FBI surveil-
lance, offered Mathews a loan which Mathews agreed to accept. 4
Two months after that conversation, Mathews took money from
DeShayer in a restaurant and was immediately arrested by the
8. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 885. Such conduct violates 18 U.S.C. § 201(g)
(1986). The statute provided for a fine of not more than $10,000.00 or a prison
term of not more than two years for:
(g) Whoever, being a public official, former public official, or person se-
lected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the
proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly asks, demands, ex-
acts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of
value for himself for or because of any official act performed or to be
performed by him.
9. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 885.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
280 [Vol. 11:279
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FBI.1 5
Mathews filed a pre-trial motion in limine in an attempt to
defend his actions with the defense of entrapment.16 Because Ma-
thews would not admit to all the elements of the charged offense,
the district court denied the motion. 17 With DeShayer as its key
witness, the government contended that Mathews accepted money
in return for which he agreed to perform officials acts for Midwest
in his capacity as administrator at the SBA.' s The government in-
troduced tape recordings of the loan discussions between the two
men in support of its contention. 9
Mathews denied DeShayer's testimony and the FBI's argu-
ments, claiming that he accepted personal loans unconnected to
his position with the SBA.2 ° He backed his argument with testi-
mony that he had previously taken personal loans from his friend
DeShayer.2 He claimed that DeShayer fortuitously offered a loan
to him just when he was in great need of monetary assistance.22
Mathews said the reasons DeShayer offered to make the loan were:
first, because DeShayer had hidden the money from his wife; sec-
ond, DeShayer did not want her to discover that fact; and third,
because if DeShayer did not make the loan, DeShayer might
squander the money.23
At the end of the testimony, Mathews moved for a mistrial on
the grounds that the district court erred in refusing to give the jury
an instruction on the entrapment defense.24 Although noting a
probable lack of evidence to support the defense, the court denied
Mathews' motion based on the rule that a defendant may not ar-
gue entrapment without admitting commission of all charged
acts.25
The jury returned a guilty verdict from which Mathews ap-
pealed.26 The United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals af-
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 885.
19. Id. at 885-886.
20. Id. at 886.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
19891
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firmed the district court's decision 2 commenting on the split be-
tween the federal courts with respect to this entrapment issue.2 8
The court held that the district court ruled correctly because of
the "per se" inconsistency in denying the crime and pleading en-
trapment.2 9 From that decision, Mathews petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court granted certio-
rari3 limited to the issue of "whether a defendant in a federal
criminal prosecution who denies commission of the crime may
nonetheless have the jury instructed, where the evidence warrants,
on the affirmative defense of entrapment."31 Through the words of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, 32 the Court held in the affirmative. 3
BACKGROUND
A. In General
Entrapment may generally be defined as an "act of officers or
agents of the government in inducing a person to commit a crime
not contemplated by him, for the purpose of instituting a criminal
prosecution against him."34 Although the early common law did
not recognize the entrapment defense,35 the United States courts
gradually began to accept the doctrine in the late nineteenth and
27. United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 1601 (1987). Mathews alleged three lower court errors. First, he argued
that the court erred with regard to the entrapment issue. Second, he alleged error
concerning the exclusion of veniremen. Last, he argued error where the lower
court denied a motion for mistrial when the prosecution removed all blacks from
the jury by use of its peremptory challenges. Id. at 326. This Note will discuss
only the alleged error regarding entrapment.
28. 803 F.2d at 327.
29. Id. The court stated, "We see no reason to allow Mathews or any defend-
ant to plead these defenses simultaneously." Id.
30. Mathews v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1601 (1987).
31. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 884-885.
32. Franklin Gimbel, Mathews' lawyer, found Chief Justice Rehnquist's ma-
jority vote pleasantly interesting given a "very hostile" moment between the two
at oral argument. Stewart, supra note 1, at 42.
33. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 886.
34. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 477 (5th ed. 1979).
35. LAFAVE AND SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2 at 421 (2d ed. 1986) [herein-
after LAFAVE AND SCOTT]; DeFeo, Entrapment As a Defense to Criminal Respon-
sibility: Its History, Theory, and Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 243 (1967). The
reader should note that the courts of Great Britain do not accept the doctrine.
See Perkins, CRIMINAL LAW § 10 at 1161 (3d ed. 1982); Marcus, The Development
of Entrapment Law, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 5, 5-9 (1986).
282 [Vol. 11:279
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early twentieth centuries.3 6 Prior to gaining approval in the courts,
the traditional view was that as long as the actor did the criminal
acts, it was irrelevant that he was tricked into so doing.3 7 Also, the
courts were not concerned with the degree of deception.3 8 Speaking
by analogy to Genesis 3:31 illustrating Eve's unsuccessful attempt
to plead entrapment, the New York Supreme Court refused to give
credence to the defense in the early and now famous case of Board
of Commissioners v. Backus. 9 The New York Court of Appeals re-
affirmed this position on entrapment in People v. Mills. 40
Eventually, the doctrine caught hold in the states41 and ulti-
mately in the federal judiciary. 42 In Woo Wai v. United States,'3
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the doctrine, applied
it, and reversed the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to import
illegal aliens into the United States." Grounded in a public policy
rationale, the court held "that a sound public policy can be upheld
36. LAFAVE AND ScoTT, supra note 35, at 421; see also Marcus, supra note 35,
at 9-11.
37. LAFAVE AND ScoTr, supra note 35, at 421.
38. Id.
39. 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (1864). Here the court stated:
Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to exist in this
case, the allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the
pleas as ancient as the world, and first interposed in Paradise: 'The
serpent beguiled me and I did eat.' That defense was overruled by the
great Lawgiver, and whatever estimate we form, or whatever judgment
pass upon the character or conduct of the tempter, this plea has never
since availed to shield crime or give indemnity to the culprit, and it is
safe to say that under any code of civilized, not to say Christian, ethics, it
never will.
Id. See Marcus, supra note 35, at 9; Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I
(Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime And The Entrapment Defense,
1973 U. ILL. L. REV. 254.
40. 178 N.Y. 274, 70 N.E. 786 (1904). The court stated, "We are asked to
protect the defendant, not because he is innocent, but because a zealous public
officer exceeded his powers and held out a bait. The courts do not look to see who
held out the bait, but to see who took it." Id. at 289, 70 N.E. at 791.
41. LAFAVE AND ScoTT, supra note 35, at 421; see also MARCUS, The Entrap-
ment Defense, § 1.03 at 8-10 (1987). See, e.g., Saunders v. Michigan, 38 Mich. 218
(1878) (lawyer accused of burglary); O'Brien v. Texas, 6 TEx. CRIM. 665 (1879)
(defendant tried to bribe a jailer in an escape attempt).
42. See generally Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal
Courts, U. PA. L. REV. 245 (1942); DeFeo, supra note 35; MARCUS, supra note 35;
Groot, supra note 39.
43. 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
44. Id. at 414-416.
1989]
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only by denying the criminality of those who are thus induced to
commit acts which infringe the letter of the criminal statutes.
4 5
After Woo Wai, all the lower federal courts began to recognize the
doctrine."'
Much time passed in our nation's history before the United
States Supreme Court decided an entrapment case. However, in
Casey v. United States,47 while Justice Holmes summarily dis-
missed the defendant's allegations of entrapment for the majority
of the Court, 8 Justice Brandeis forcefully argued in the dissent
that the doctrine applied.49 Distinguishing the present case from
those where the defendant already intended to commit a crime,
Justice Brandeis argued:
The obstacle to the prosecution lies in the fact that the al-
leged crime was instigated by officers of the government; that the
act for which the government seeks to punish the defendant is the
fruit of their criminal conspiracy to induce its commission. The
government may set decoys to entrap criminals. But it may not
provoke or create a crime and then punish the criminal, its
creature.5
The United States Supreme Court would wait until 1932 before
conclusively embracing the doctrine of entrapment.
1. The Subjective View
In Sorrels v. United States,51 a majority of the United States
Supreme Court for the first time adopted the entrapment de-
fense. 52 The Court through Chief Justice Hughes recognized that
the government may give criminals the opportunity to commit
45. Id. at 415.
46. MARCUS, supra note 35, at 13.
47. 276 U.S. 413 (1928) (attorney convicted of narcotics offenses).
48. Id. at 418.
49. Id. at 423.
50. Id. at 423. Justice Brandeis concluded, "[t]his prosecution should be
stopped, not because some right of Casey's has been denied, but in order to pro-
tect the government. To protect it from illegal conduct of its officers. To preserve
the purity of its courts." Id. The reader should note it appears that Justice Bran-
deis would be in favor of the objective view of entrapment. See infra note 60 and
accompanying text.
51. 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (where the evidence produced at trial sufficiently
warranted reversal of defendant's conviction for illegally possessing and selling
whiskey).
52. Id.
[Vol. 11:279
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crimes and may prosecute those who carry out their own criminal
intent.5 3 The Court continued that a different problem is posed
when the government implants the criminal intent into a person
who had not previously entertained such intent. 4 Citing a lower
federal appellate court case, 55 the Court held as permissible, decoys
used to catch criminals who already possess the intent, but speci-
fied that "decoys are not permissible to ensnare the innocent and
law-abiding into the commission of crime."56The Court's rationale for what has become known as the sub-
jective view of entrapment, which is also the majority view, placed
its focus on congressional intent. Chief Justice Hughes reasoned
that Congress in no way intended convictions to be validly main-
tained where government officials instigated the crime in the
minds of innocent persons.57 As a corollary to this view, the center
of inquiry should be directed toward the "otherwise innocent" de-
fendant and his predisposition to commit the crime.58 The Court
explained, "[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrap-
ment, he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry
into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that
issue."59
2. The Objective View
Justice Roberts writing for the minority concurred in the re-
sult but disagreed with the majority as to the reasons forming the
basis of the doctrine.60 Espousing the objective view to entrap-
ment,61 Justice Roberts argued that the congressional intent ra-
53. Id. at 441.
54. Id. at 442.
55. Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128 (4th Cir. 1924).
56. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 445.
57. Id. at 448. A succinct statement of the Court's rationale is found in the
words of Chief Justice Warren in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
"Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempt-
ing innocent persons into violations." Id. at 372.
58. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451. As the Court stated in Sherman, "To determine
whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." Sherman, 356
U.S. at 372.
59. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
60. Id. at 453. Justice Brandeis joined in the dissenting opinion.
61. The reader should note that the United States Supreme Court still ad-
heres to the subjective view. The Court reaffirmed SorrelUs in Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); United
19891
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tionale could not be valid and in his view amounted to "judicial
amendment" of Acts of Congress. 2 The minority opinion also re-
jected the notion that the defendant's predisposition was at issue."
The minority emphasized that the objective view rests on the pub-
lic policy to protect defendants from unacceptable law enforce-
ment practices."4 This approach concentrates not upon a defend-
ant's predisposition, but upon whether the law enforcement
practice at issue falls below satisfactory standards of police con-
duct.66 Under this approach, the trial judge would decide whether
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and Mathews, 108
S.Ct. 883. While each occasion provided for the Court an opportunity to reaffirm
Sorrells, each also allowed those who favored the objective view to reargue their
position. Thus, forceful reasoning of the objective approach appears in the con-
curring opinion by Justice Frankfurter in Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378; by Justice
Stewart in Russell, 411 U.S. at 439; and by Justice Brennan in Hampton, 425 U.S.
at 495. The reader should note Justice Brennan's seeming acquiescence to the
subjective view in Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 888.
Although a minority approach, the objective view carries a substantial follow-
ing. At least twelve states follow this view by statute or by case law. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT § 11.81.450 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN § 5-2-209 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 702-237 (1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1968); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-05-11 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 313 (1973); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
8.06 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (1973). See also People v. Bar-
raza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947 (1979); State v. Mullen, 216
N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974); People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973);
State v. Wilkins, 144 Vt. 22, 473 A.2d 295 (1983). Several observations are worth
noting. The New Jersey statute provides for a combined approach. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C: 2-12 (West 1979). Tennessee was the latest state to officially recognize
the entrapment defense. In a difficult decision, the state's high court adopted the
subjective approach, but it appears that the ruling could easily be reversed. See
State v. Jones, 498 S.W.2d 209, 218-220 (Tenn. 1980). Also note that the objective
view is endorsed by a majority of the legal community and by the American Law
Institute. See Mullock, The Logic of Entrapment, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 739, 740-741
(1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1962).
62. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456. See Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Sherman where he explained, "[T]he only legislative intention that can with any
show of reason be extracted from the statute is the intention to make criminal
precisely the conduct in which the defendant has engaged." Sherman, 356 U.S. at
379.
63. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458-459.
64. Id. at 457.
65. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382. The critical factor is whether objectively such
police conduct "would entrap only those ready and willing oto commit crime." Id.
at 384.
[Vol. 11:279
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police conduct falls below the acceptable limits.6 The burden of
proof would rest on the defendant. 7
3. Burden of Proof
Courts agree that the defense of entrapment is an affirmative
defense.68 Under the subjective view of the defense, the rule as to
burden of proof allocation has been classically formulated by
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Sherman.6 9 Two fact
questions must be answered in cases involving the defense:
(1)[D]id the agent induce the accused to commit the offense
charged in the indictment; (2) if so, was the accused ready and
willing without persuasion and was he awaiting any propitious op-
portunity to commit the offense. On the first question, the ac-
cused has the burden; on the second, the prosecution has it."
As to the defendant's burden, most courts hold that "some evi-
dence" showing governmental activity likely to cause an otherwise
innocent person to commit a crime is sufficient.71 "Mere solicita-
tion" is not adequate proof.7 2 If the defendant fails to meet this
burden, the court will not put the issue to the jury.73 Such a deter-
mination is one for the court to make. If the defendant meets his
burden, the burden will shift to the government. 5 The government
66. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457; see also Russell, 411 U.S. at 441.
67. LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 5.3 at 425 (1984) [hereinafter
LAFAVE AND ISRAELI.
68. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 886; United States v. Perl, 584 F.2d 1316, 1321
(4th Cir. 1978).
69. 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1952).
70. Id. at 882-883.
71. See United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 834 (11th Cir. 1982); Kadis v.
United States, 373 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1967). Compare United States v. To-
bias, 662 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1981) (government conduct creating "substantial
risk" that otherwise innocent would commit the crime). See also LAFAVE AND
ISRAEL, supra note 67, at 425; MARCUS, supra note 41, at 60.
72. See United States v. Perry, 478 F.2d 1276 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1005 (1975); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 436 (1963). See also,
Turner, Kurrus, and Grisoti, Entrapment: The Traditional Defense and a "Due
Process" Alternative, Seminar in Criminal Defense Litigation compilation, at 2-3
(1984).
73 United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 933 (1971).
74. United States v. Tate, 554 F.2d 1341, 1344 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Teeslink, 421 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1970).
75. LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, supra note 67, at 425; Marcus, supra note 41, at 60;
1989]
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must then prove the defendant's predisposition to commit the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.7 6
4. Pleading Entrapment
The typical manner of raising the defense is to do so along
with a not-guilty plea.77 However, the issue dealt with in Mathews
concerned a different strategical approach: deny the acts and plead
entrapment. Before Mathews, the United States Supreme Court
had not discussed the issue of whether a criminal defendant could
both deny committing the charged acts of the offense and avail
himself of the defense. The lower federal courts' attempts to re-
solve the issue produced division among the circuits.7 8 Also, the
state courts have ruled on the subject." In a majority of both the
federal and state courts, this defense strategy was not allowed."0
B. Development in the Circuit Courts
The early history of the inconsistency rule remains uncer-
tain.8 ' The Fourth Circuit set forth the rule in Nutter v. United
Turner, supra note 72, at 3.
76. United States v. Humphrey, 670 F.2d 153, 155-156 (11th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Bocra, 623 F.2d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875
(1980); United States v. Viviano, 437 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 983 (1971). See also LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, supra note 67, at 425; MARCUS,
supra note 41, at 60; Turner, supra note 72, at 3.
77. See United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203, 210-211 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 2534 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1108
(1984). See also Groot, supra note 39, at 258-259. See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2d
Criminal Law § 208 (1981).
78. See generally Annotation, Availability in Federal Court of Defense of
Entrapment Where Accused Denies Committing Acts Which Constitute Offense
Charged, 54 A.L.R. FED. 644 (1981). The scope of this Note only covers the situa-
tion presented in Mathews, i.e., where the defendant seeks to deny acts and use
the entrapment defense. There exist other variations for use of the defense such
as where the defendant seeks to deny the intent element of the crime, not the
acts, and to plead entrapment. For a thorough examination of the variations, see
Note, Entrapment and Denial of the Crime: A Defense of the Inconsistency
Rule, 1986 DuK L.J. 866 [hereinafter Note, Entrapment and Denial].
79. See generally Annotation, Availability in State Court of Defense of En-
trapment Where Accused Denies Committing Acts Which Constitute Offense
Charged, 5 A.L.R. 4TH 1128 (1981) [hereinafter Annotation, Availability in State
Court]. See also infra note 238.
80. For federal cases, see infra notes 82-141. For state cases, see infra note
238.
81. Groot, supra note 39, at 260 n.31.
[Vol. 11:279
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States.82 In Nutter, the government indicted the defendant on
charges of the illegal sale of morphine.8 3 The jury acquitted the
defendant on all but the first of five counts in the indictment." He
appealed alleging, inter alia, that he had been entrapped into the
sale.85 At trial, he had testified that no sale occurred.86 The court,
citing no authority, ruled that in order to raise the entrapment de-
fense, the defendant must admit to the acts.8 7 After Nutter, fed-
eral courts adopting the inconsistency rule did so apparently with-
out relying on legal authority.8 Although the precise origin of the
rule remains cloudy, each of the federal circuits had chosen a posi-
tion to follow. The inconsistency rule enjoyed a ten-to-two lead
with the minority anchored by the Ninth and District of Columbia
Circuits.
1. Circuits Adhering to the Inconsistency Rule
The First Circuit ruled in 1963 that a defendant could not
utilize the entrapment defense unless he first admitted to the acts
charged. 9 In 1980, the First Circuit reaffirmed the inconsistency
rule in United States v. Annese.90 In Annese, the defendants ap-
pealed a jury conviction of methamphetamine production."' Noting
that some inconsistency remains allowable as where a defendant
does not testify yet pleads entrapment, the court ruled that too
much inconsistency results when the defendant denies the charged
acts and seeks to use the entrapment defense.2
The Second Circuit's position on the inconsistency rule is con-
fusing. In United States v. Pagaro,93 the defendant appealed his
conviction of the illegal sale of heroin.9 4 On appeal, this court af-
82. 289 F. 484 (4th Cir. 1923). See Groot, supra note 39, at 260.
83. 289 F. at 484.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 485.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See United States v. Georgians, 333 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. de-
nied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); Bakotich v. United States, 4 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1925).
See also Groot, supra note 39, at 260 n.31.
89. Sylvia v. United States, 312 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 1963) (defendant con-
victed of selling a small quantity of heroin).
90. 631 F.2d 1041 (ist Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 1042.
92. Id. at 1047.
93. 207 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1953).
94. Id. at 884-85.
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firmed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the entrap-
ment defense because the defendant denied having made any
sale.95 Thus, the Second Circuit appeared to have adopted the in-
consistency rule. However, in a later decision, the Second Circuit
ruled that it had not yet resolved the problem of inconsistent
pleadings and that the issue remained open." Nevertheless, in
United States v. Mayo,97 the court timely adopted the inconsis-
tency rule.9
The Third Circuit has been consistent through the years. In
United States v. Hill," the defendant appealed a conviction of
narcotics distribution.100 Relying on United States v. Watson,' 1
the court ruled that for the defendant to use the entrapment de-
fense, he must first admit all the elements of the crime, including
the mens rea.102
One circuit has recently reevaluated its position as to this
problem and has consequently adopted the inconsistency rule.
Before 1986, the Fourth Circuit followed the rule in Crisp v.
United States,1 03 which allowed a defendant to deny the acts and
plead entrapment. The Fourth Circuit changed its stance in
United States v. Dorta.104 Based upon an interest in conformity to
the majority view and in protecting the truth-finding function of
criminal trials,10 5 the court held, "[T]he better rule is that defend-
ants are not entitled to a jury instruction on entrapment when
they testify that they have not committed the crime charged."1 06
The Fifth Circuit followed the inconsistency rule10 7 but fash-
95. Id. at 885.
96. United States v. Brown, 544 F.2d 1155, 1159 (2d Cir. 1976)
97. 705 F.2d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1983).
98. Id. at 72-73.
99. 655 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981).
100. Id. at 514.
101. 489 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1973).
102. Hill, 655 F.2d at 514.
103. 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1958) (where the lower court refused to submit to
the jury the defense of entrapment for a defendant indicted on narcotics viola-
tions who denied the charged acts. This court reversed stating that a defendant
shall be allowed alternative defenses.) Id. at 70.
104. 783 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3274 (1986).
105. Id. at 1181.
106. Id. at 1181-1182.
107. United States v. Rez, 706 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant convicted
of conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute); United States v.
O'Leary, 529 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1976) (defendant convicted of conspiracy to im-
port marijuana, cocaine, and hashish oil).
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ioned two exceptions to it in United States v. Henry. ' The first
exception is that a defendant may plead entrapment and also deny
the criminal intent. In Henry, a pharmacist was convicted of ille-
gally dispensing controlled substances. 10 9 The defendant testified
that he had no criminal intent." 0 The defendant also requested an
instruction on the entrapment defense which the lower court de-
nied."' The circuit court reversed." 2 While adhering to the incon-
sistency rule," 3 the court held that a defendant may deny the
criminal intent and plead an entrapment defense."" Thus, the
court reaffirmed the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in an ear-
lier case, Henderson v. United States."5
The Henry court embraced created the second exception by
ruling that United States v. Greenfield"6 still applied in the Fifth
Circuit."' The Greenfield Court followed the inconsistency rule,
but added that such a rule "is not unbending.""18 With reliance
placed upon Sears v. United States,"9 the Greenfield Court held
that where the government's evidence injects the issue of entrap-
ment into the case a defendant may deny the charged acts and
plead entrapment. 20 The Henry Court adopted this holding as the
second exception to the inconsistency rule.' 2'
The Sixth Circuit also adhered to the inconsistency rule in
United States v. Bryant,'2 2 where the defendant was convicted of
the illegal purchase of fox pelts.' 23 Because the defendant denied
commission of all elements of the crime, the lower court refused to
108. 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984).
109. Id. at 206.
110. Id.
ill. Id.
112. Id. at 214.
113. Id. at 205.
114. Id.
115. 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
116. 554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1979) (defend-
ant convicted of making illegal prescriptions of controlled substances. The lower
court refused to allow defendant the entrapment defense unless he admitted com-
mitting the criminal acts.).
117. Henry, 749 F.2d at 213.
118. Greenfield, 554 F.2d at 182.
119. 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965).
120. Greenfield, 554 F.2d at 182.
121. Henry, 749 F.2d at 213.
122. 716 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1009 (1984).
123. Id. at 1093-94.
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instruct on entrapment. 124 The Sixth Circuit court agreed, stating
that in order to use the defense, the defendant must admit "each
and every element of the crime."1 2  Recent Sixth Circuit cases re-
affirmed this position. 26
Both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have adopted the incon-
sistency rule. In United States v. Liparota,'21 a case concerning
illegally obtaining and possessing food stamps, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its position.1 28 Although earlier Eighth
Circuit case law expressed a contrary view,129 the later cases sup-
ported the inconsistency rule."'0
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits adopted the inconsistency
rule. In Munroe v. United States,13' where the defendants were
convicted of illegally selling amphetamines, the Tenth Circuit
ruled that the lower court correctly denied defendants' use of the
entrapment defense because they denied committing the charged
crime. 132 The Eleventh Circuit took an approach similar to that of
the Fifth Circuit. In United States v. Smith, 33 the jury convicted
the defendant of distributing and conspiracy to distribute co-
caine."" The court followed the inconsistency rule. 35 The court
ruled that while a defendant may plead inconsistent defenses in
other contexts, such defenses are not permissible in this setting.1 3
The court viewed its rule as facilitating the truth-finding function
of a criminal trial"1 37 and promoting economy of the prosecution's
time spent in trial preparation.138 However, the Eleventh Circuit
124. Id. at 1094.
125. Id.
126. United States v. Whitley, 734 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1984) "To rely on the
defense of entrapment, the defendant must admit all elements of the offense." Id.
at 1139. Cf. United States v. Prickett, 790 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1986) (defendant was
not allowed to deny intent and plead entrapment).
127. 735 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 419
(1985).
128. Id. at 1048.
129. Robinson v. United States, 32 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1928).
130. Wore v. United States, 259 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1958).
131. 424 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1970).
132. Id. at 244.
133. 757 F.2d 1161 (11th Cir. 1985), reh'g. denied, 763 F.2d 419 (11th Cir.
1985) (en banc).
134. Id. at 1164.
135. Id. at 1167.
136. Id. at 1167-68.
137. Id. at 1168.
138. Id.
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did identify two exceptions to its rule. The first exception occurs
when the government's own case raises the issue of entrapment.139
Second, as long as the defendant's defenses do not "necessarily dis-
prove" one another, a defendant may argue apparently inconsis-
tent defenses.140 In the court's words, "[A] defendant may assert
entrapment along with another defense so long as a jury could con-
sistently find that he or she is entitled to either defense without
changing its view of the facts."'
2. Circuits Allowing Denials and the Entrapment Defense
One would perhaps think that with all the authority maintain-
ing the inconsistency rule, there would be no court prepared to fol-
low a different path. However, such was not the case. The United
States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the District of
Columbia Circuit allowed a defendant to deny the acts and plead
entrapment. The Ninth Circuit had previously traveled on a differ-
ent track. In Eastman v. United States, 1 2 the defendants ap-
pealed convictions of unlawfully importing opium into the United
States.143 The defendants alleged trial error in not instructing the
jury on entrapment.1 4 4 The court affirmed the trial court's decision
reasoning that it is logically inconsistent to deny the crime and
plead entrapment.4 5 The court also seemed concerned that such a
defense might confuse the jury.4 6 The Eastman147 holding re-
mained effective until being overruled by United States v.
Demma. 8
In the Demma case, the defendants denied the requisite intent
in their subsequent convictions for conspiracy to import and dis-
tribute heroin. "1 9 They did not deny doing the actual physical acts,
only the intent element.1 50 The defendants requested an instruc-
139. Id. See United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1984).
140. Smith, 757 F.2d at 1168. See Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169
(5th Cir. 1956).
141. Id.
142. 212 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954).
143. Id. at 321.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 322.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975).
149. Id. at 982.
150. Id.
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tion on entrapment which the district court denied because of the
inconsistency rule.151 In reversing the district court's decision, the
court set forth five reasons underlying its conclusion. First, the
court believed that Eastman impermissibly relieved the govern-
ment of its burden under Sorrells to "prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the acts charged were non-entrapment acts."' 5 Second,
the court stressed that a defendant should be able to plead "gar-
den-variety alternative contentions," as where the defendant re-
mains silent and asserts the entrapment defense.'53 Nevertheless,
the court stated that because the inconsistency theory only applies
to where the defendant denies the charged acts, not intent, the
Eastman rule does not apply to this case.154 Third, the court ob-
served that defendants in criminal prosecutions may assert incon-
sistent defenses because of the strong public policy in favor of af-
fording defendants "every reasonable protection" in criminal
prosecutions. 5 5 Fourth, the court then held the Eastman rule an
untenable exception to the general rule allowing inconsistent de-
fenses. 56 The court turned to address a practical aspect of the new
rule when it pointed out that pleading inconsistent defenses may
not be wise. "Inconsistent testimony by the defendant seriously
impairs and potentially destroys his credibility.'15 7 Finally, the
court believed that the Eastman rule raises constitutional
problems with self-incrimination and should therefore be
avoided." 8
The District of Columbia Circuit also allowed the defendant to
deny acts and plead entrapment. In Hansford v. United States,159
where the jury convicted the defendant of the illegal sale of heroin
capsules, the court determined that the denial of the charged crime
and a plea of entrapment were permissible and alternative, but
were not inconsistent. 6 ' The court reasoned that a defendant
151. Id.
152. Id. at 983.
153. Id. at 984.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 985.
156. Id. "It is an exception without any justification. There is no conceivable
reason for permitting a defendant to assert inconsistent defenses in other context
but denying him that right in the context of entrapment." Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 986. See also Groot, supra note 39, at 269-275.
159. 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
160. Id. at 221.
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could consistently assert that a certain act did not occur and si-
multaneously assert that should the jury believe the act occurred,
the government induced the act through entrapment. 61
Although a majority of the federal courts had adopted the in-
consistency rule, two circuits allowed the defendant the benefit of
pleading entrapment and denying the criminal acts. The reason
behind the United States Supreme Court's delay in waiting until
Mathews to resolve the controversy remains unclear. Previous
cases had presented the Supreme Court with ample opportunity to
review the inconsistency theory. 112 Congress empowered the Su-
preme Court through a federal statute the right to review by cer-
tiorari decisions of the courts of appeals. 163 "Certiorari is granted
• . . in cases where there is a real and embarassing conflict of opin-
ion and authority between the circuit courts of appeal,"' 64 and
where there is a "need for a uniform rule."' 6 Mathews presented
the Court with an issue meeting these criteria, and the Court
granted certiorari to review the case.' 66
ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Approach
In the Mathews decision, a strong majority of the Court spoke
through the well-reasoned opinion drafted by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist. 67 After a brief overview of the history and general rules of
entrapment. Chief Justice Rehnquist began a structured analysis
of the issue, setting forth the government's arguments only to then
explain their inadequacies.'68
The government advanced four propositions for maintenance
of the inconsistency theory. First, the government argued that a
definitional inconsistency exists when the defendant desires to
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 104, 122, and 127.
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) (1988).
164. NLRB v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U.S. 498, 502 (1951).
165. Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 501 (1962).
166. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1601
(1987).
167. The casting of votes left the Court split on the issue by a six-to-two
decision. In the majority were Rehnquist, C.J., Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and
O'Connor, J.J. Brennan, J. filed a concurring opinion. Scalia, J. concurred in the
judgment. White, J. wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Blackman, J.
Kennedy, J. did not participate.
168. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 886-887.
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deny the crime and plead entrapment because by the definition of
entrapment the crime was necessarily committed."8 9 This argument
has considerable merit.17 0 The argument, from a purely logical ap-
proach, is valid.17 ' The argument goes "No I did not, and yes I did
but. . . ." The Court, however, dealt with the argument by articu-
lating a two-part response.
First, the Court relying on Stevenson v. United States1 2 and
Wharton's Criminal Procedure' stated that a defendant is gener-
ally entitled to assert any recognized defense when sufficient evi-
dence exists to support that defense.17 4 In Stevenson, the Court
ruled that the evidence warranted instruction as to both self-de-
fense and manslaughter for a defendant convicted of a murder re-
sulting from a gunfight.17 5 By offering the general rule as a matter
of fact, the Court left itself open to criticism by the minority. 7 6
The Court could have gone further to support the contention by
explaining the policy behind such a rule. The policy exists in our
belief that in cases where significant liberty interests are in jeop-
ardy, criminal defendants should be given "every reasonable pro-
tection" in their defense.177 Additionally, the Court should have
considered the possibility that such a rationale provides the justifi-
cation for the recognized exceptions to the inconsistency theory
held previously by various federal appellate courts in cases where
the government's own evidence raises the issue or where the de-
fendant's defenses do not "necessarily disprove" each other.17 By
following this course of action, the Court could have lessened the
impact of the dissenter's subsequent retaliation against the initial
premise.
169. Id. at 886-87.
170. Id. For the foundation of the definitional analysis, the government relied
on Russell, 411 U.S. at 435.
171. Symbolically it would be represented by the statement form P. - P
(where "P" represents "proposition," "." represents "and," and "P" represents
"not proposition.") COPI SYMBOLIC LOGIC (5th ed. 1979). See also Groot, supra
note 39, at 259.
172. 162 U.S. 313 (1896).
173. 4 C. Torcia, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 538 (12th ed. 1976).
174. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 887.
175. Stevenson, 162 U.S. at 323.
176. The reader should note the cases cited in footnote 1 of the dissenting
opinion stand contrary to the majority's general rule. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 890,
n.1.
177. Demma, 523 F.2d at 985.
178. See supra notes 108-120 and 139-141 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Court responded with a "so-what" argument. The
Court stated that the federal courts already allow inconsistent de-
fenses in the criminal law arena.17 9 Examples offered in support of
this proposition included only cases from the District of Columbia
Circuit."' Although the proposition may be valid, such scant au-
thority hardly supports the view that federal appellate courts per-
mit such defense."8 ' The Court nonetheless accurately assessed the
status of the law.' 82 The Court should have substantiated its view
of the law with added endorsements of scholars in the field who
support this view. 83 From a different angle, the Court legitimately
could have argued that the defense is not so much inconsistent as
it is alternative. 8
4
The second proposition offered by the government apparently
argued that because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do
not contain a rule authorizing inconsistent pleadings, while the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do,185 Congress must not have in-
tended to allow such defenses in federal criminal trials.' 8 The
Court sufficiently dealt with the argument by distinguishing the
systems of pleadings in civil and criminal cases. The Court con-
cluded that the reason Congress did not include a counterpart to
the civil rules in the criminal rules was because criminal trials re-
quire a less elaborate system of pleadings. 87 While this argument
adequately disposes of the government's assertion, the Court might
have gone further and formulated the argument that: first, the
Federal Rules do not prohibit inconsistent pleadings; second, pol-
179. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 887.
180. Johnson v. United States, 426 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (where the court
in a rape case allowed defendant to deny the rape and also plead consent as a
defense). Womack v. United States, 336 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (where the
court allowed defendant to plead accident and self-defense in a homicide
prosecution).
181. In the words of the dissenting opinion "[g]iven the rarity of reported
federal cases on this question, drawing any conclusion about the prevailing prac-
tice in the federal courts is difficult." Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 890 n.1.
182. For supporting authority, see Groot, supra note 39, at 259; Note, Plead-
ing the Entrapment Defense: The Propriety of Inconsistency, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 1025, 1040-1041 (1984); Nagle, Inconsistent Defenses in Criminal Cases, 92
MIL. L. REV. 77, 79 (1981).
183. LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, supra note 67, at 424.
184. Hansford, 303 F.2d at 221.
185. FED, R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
186. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 887.
187. Id.
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icy allows a defendant all possible defenses; and third, if a person
may plead inconsistent defenses in the civil setting where the
stakes are arguably lower than in the criminal context, then surely
a defendant should be allowed to plead inconsistently in a criminal
case.
For the third argument, the government contended that al-
lowing the inconsistent pleading will foster perjury, confuse juries,
and undermine the truth-finding function of the criminal trial.'88
Such reasoning has been persuasively given in support of the in-
consistency theory on the appellate level.'89 Indeed, the govern-
ment's concerns were admirable. All should agree that the truth-
seeking function of the courts is an important policy deserving
protection.
The Court reasoned that such concerns are misplaced in this
setting.'90 First, the Court pointed out that the same argument
could apply to the civil context, but inconsistent pleadings are al-
lowed there.' 9 ' Second, the Court refused to believe that perjury
would necessarily be sanctioned and encouraged by the new rule.'92
Speaking from a practical point of view, the Court realized that the
risk of perjury will be slight because the strategy of denying the
crime and pleading entrapment subjects the defendant's credibility
to greater scrutiny.'93 In essence, the Court meant that few defend-
ants will choose this strategy; and those who do, will perhaps do
more harm to themselves than good.'
The analysis given by the Court is persuasive but for one ex-
ception. It is perhaps specious to say that inconsistent defenses
should be allowed in the criminal arena because the listed concerns
exist in the civil arena and yet such defenses are still allowed. Such
reasoning suggests that defendants in both contexts will be equally
motivated to win their cases. Such a proposition proves questiona-
ble given the nature of criminal trials and the interests which are
at stake. It may be fallacious to say that if a defendant in a civil
case will not perjure himself, he also will not perjure himself in a
188. Id.
189. See Crisp, 783 F.2d at 1181-82; Smith, 757 F.2d at 1161; see also United
States v. Rey, 706 F.2d 145, 147 (1983); see generally Note, Entrapment and De-
nial, supra note 78.
190. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 887-88.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 888.
194. Id.
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criminal case.Additionally, the Court might have taken the analysis a bit
further. In acknowledging that the purpose of the trial is to dis-
cover the truth, the Court could have suggested that by allowing
inconsistent defenses, a jury will be better able to fulfill its func-
tion. 195 Also, it could have been argued that through continued ex-
istence of the inconsistency rule, a defendant will be compelled to
commit perjury.19 He may believe that his better means of defense
rests with pleading entrapment and although he did not commit all
of the charged acts, he would be forced into admitting to so doing
in order to avail himself of the defense.
The Court quickly dismissed the government's final argument.
The government maintained that Congress did not intend to allow
inconsistent defenses evidenced by the fact that Congress has not
specifically allowed them.1 97 The Court responded by stating that
the absence of any Congressional action does not compel the gov-
ernment's conclusion but does leave the issue for the Court to de-
cide. 198 The majority decided the issue by holding that "even if the
defendant denies one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled
to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment."'9 9
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan expressed agreement
with the majority as to resolution of the issue in the case. Justice
Brennan also took the opportunity to acquiesce to the subjective
view of entrapment held by a majority of the Court since Sor-
rells.200 Justice Brennan stated that while he personally preferred
the objective view, "I bow to stare decisis, and today join the judg-
ment and reasoning of the Court."' 0'
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion illustrated that in practical
application of the new rule, the interests of justice will be pro-
tected through the "self-penalizing" nature of pleading inconsis-
tent defenses. 02 Justice Scalia further argued that any inconsis-
tency present is merely a formal one, arising only when
entrapment is defined as to require commission of the charged
195. Groot, supra note 39, at 268-269.
196. Id.
197. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 888.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 886.
200. Id. at 888-889.
201. Id. at 889.
202. Id.
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crime.2 03 Justice Scalia's argument asserted that because the extra
element is not a part of the definition of entrapment, one should
be allowed to deny committing the crime. He went on to admit
that the defense cannot be used unless a crime is shown, "but in
that sense all affirmative defenses assume commission of the
crime."20 " Nevertheless, even if the third element is a part of the
definition, the "self-penalizing" aspect of the inconsistent plead-
ings insures the furtherance of justice and outweighs any "special
prophylactic rule."20 5
B. The Dissenters' Approach
The dissenting justices chose an analytical approach which be-
gan by determining the "only" possible rationale for the majority's
decision, followed by a three-part argument concerning why that
rationale could not apply to the present situation. Justice White,
joined by Justice Blackmun, began the analysis by agreeing with
the majority's assessment as to the lack of constitutional grounds
for the decision and the absence of any Act of Congress or Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure on the subject. 0 6 The dissenters then
made reference to the fact that the civil rules do contain an au-
thoritative provision on point. 0 7 While not expressly saying so, the
justices appear to be forwarding the argument made by the govern-
ment that if there is an explicit rule in the civil context and not in
the criminal, then Congress did not intend for there to be one. The
dissenters criticized the majority for the lack of authority in sup-
port of the proposition that the law generally permits inconsistent
defenses.20 Likewise, they continued the assault by expressing the
fact that the majority approach did not conform to the majority
rule on the federal appellate level.20 9 From the dissenter's view, the
only rationale left for the Court to base its decision rests with a
general proposition which allows a defendant to put forth any rec-
ognized defense when sufficient evidence exists to support that de-
203. Id. Justice Scalia stated, "I see no reason why the third element is es-
sential, unless it is for the very purpose of rendering the defense unavailable with-
out admission of the crime." Id. (The third element is actual commission of the
crime.).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 890.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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fense.210 The dissenters argued, and later attempted to demon-
strate, that the "general proposition" does not apply in this
setting.211
The dissenters correctly noted that the Constitution does not
hold the answer to the problem, nor has Congress spoken. Yet, the
congressional intent argument implied in the dissent fails for the
reasons argued by the majority.212 The fact that Congress did not
include the rule in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure cannot
provide a concrete basis for a denial of its existence. The majority's
support of the view that courts generally permit inconsistent de-
fenses in criminal trials deserved the criticism it received in light
of the lack of authority presented for such a vital ground in the
majority's argument. The deficiency in case citations alone, how-
ever, may not be persuasively used in attack of the general rule.21 8
Likewise, the fact that a majority of lower courts applied one rule,
while obviously of some concern, provides little substantial incen-
tive for also choosing that rule in this case. When a majority of the
federal appellate courts apply a rule which merits change, the
Court should do so even if it means accepting the minority
approach.
The first argument the dissenters offered to back their belief
that the general proposition does not apply to entrapment finds its
basis in some unique nature of the entrapment defense.21 The dis-
senters acknowledged that inconsistent defenses remain viable in
civil proceedings for various policy reasons.215 They went as far as
to agree that inconsistent defenses should be allowed in some crim-
inal cases.21 " Yet, when the focus turned to entrapment, "a rela-
tively limited defense,"2 7 the argument emerged that by definition
when a defendant denies the acts and concurrently asserts entrap-
ment, the defendant must by lying.21 8 Policy as well as authority
denies the defendant any right to lie at trial. 1 9
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 887.
213. See supra notes 180-183 and accompanying text.
214. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 890. See United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161,
1167-1168 (11th Cir. 1985).
215. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 890.
216. Id. See Smith, 757 F.2d at 1167-1168.
217. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 890.
218. Id. at 890-891.
219. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986).
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The dissenters drafted a compelling argument based on the
definition of entrapment, but still missed the point. First, the dis-
senter's definitional argument may be incorrect.220 Second, if any
inconsistency exists, it is purely technical.2 2' Sound policy should
disregard purely formal logic in determining the validity of a legal
rule; rather, the realities of the situation under consideration must
be viewed. Facts may produce evidence sufficient to support both
defenses as they did in the present case. The majority understood
this and limited the holding to such situations.222 Finally, the pol-
icy with which the dissenters concern themselves is the prevention
of the defendant's alleged lies. If true, then the same concerns
should be present in the civil context. Yet, the dissenters would
permit a defendant in a tort action to deny a duty of care was
owed, but if it was owed, it was met.223 Both assertions cannot be
true. According to the dissenters, the defendant must therefore be
lying. However, this is not an accurate conclusion. In both con-
texts, the defendant is not lying but is simply asserting alternative
defenses to an action against him.
The dissenting justices argued as their second rationale the
rise of perjury resulting from adherence to the new rule. They ob-
served that the Court has always worked to combat perjury.2 "
They then attacked the majority's concession that since anything
is possible, perjury may increase with the conclusory statement,
"This is reason enough to reject the Court's result.122 5 They con-
tinued by stating that even if inconsistent defenses do not increase
the risk of perjury in civil cases, the risk will increase in criminal
cases because the stakes are greater and must therefore be mini-
mized by disallowance of such defenses.2 26 They conclude with an
assertion that by allowing the inconsistent defenses the Court
sanctions perjury because the defendant is arguing two defenses,
one of which is false.227
First, the dissenters should not have made the argument that
a mere possibility of perjury provides adequate support for re-
jecting the new rule. Absolutes are difficult to find in law. Second,
220. See supra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
221. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 889.
222. Id. at 886.
223. Id. at 891.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 891.
227. Id.
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the risk of perjury does exist in civil cases, but inconsistent de-
fenses are allowed. An equally tenable counterargument may be
made regarding the alleged increased stakes of the criminal trial. If
the stakes are greater, a defendant more often than not will choose
not to plead inconsistently because of the potential decrease in his
credibility.228 This self-penalizing aspect of the defense diminishes
any possible risk of perjury.229 Lastly, the argument made concern-
ing the sanctioning of perjury, as we have seen, rests upon a faulty
premise and is therefore not persuasive.
The final argument asserted by the dissenting justices stressed
that even if the new rule does not increase perjury, juries will be
confused by the defendant's pleading. This confusion requires a
different rule because more defendants may gain acquittals due to
the confusion.2 30 However, juries will be capable of understanding
the realities of the facts and the defense. "I did not do it, but if
you think I did, the government entrapped me into doing it," is
not an incomprehensible idea. Moreover, the prosecutor who ex-
pects the defendant will plead inconsistently can take steps to se-
lect a jury less capable of being confused. Finally, the mere possi-
bility that the confusion-producing "shell games ' " may foster
unwarranted acquittals lacks persuasive impact as it is just that, a
hypothetical chance, offered without supporting evidence.
Surprisingly, the dissenting justices failed to mention the few
recognized exceptions to the inconsistency theory.23 2 Those excep-
tions could have been used to further an argument that the prob-
lem could be resolved with an exception rather than a new rule,
especially given the overwhelming support of the inconsistency
theory on the appellate level. Further, the majority did not include
as a rationale for its decision the constitutional argument enunci-
ated by at least one court and several commentators that when a
defendant is forced to admit to the crime to plead entrapment, he
is deprived of his fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimi-
nation.2 s Perhaps the majority considered the argument, disagreed
with it, and hence did not include it or they possibly did not con-
sider it at all. The ultimate cause of the omission nonetheless re-
228. Id. at 888.
229. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
230. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 891-892.
231. Id. at 892.
232. See supra notes 108-120 and 139-141 and accompanying text.
233. See Demma, 523 F.2d at 986; Groot, supra note 39, at 269-275; Nagle,
supra note 182, at 98; Note, Entrapment and Denial, supra note 78, at 883.
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mains irrelevant as the majority adequately supported itself and
correctly structured the new rule.
However, the Mathews rule only applies on the federal level.
States are free to fashion their own approach, and indeed most
have. 23' Even though most states follow the inconsistency rule, in-
cluding North Carolina, the North Carolina courts should change
positions and adopt the Mathews rule.
IMPACT ON NORTH CAROLINA
Although violations of a defendant's federal or state due pro-
cess rights may occur with outrageous police conduct, 35 the en-
234. See generally Annotation, Availability in a State Court, supra note 79.
235. See, e.g., Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (where a defendant was convicted
of the unlawful manufacturing of methamphetamines, the Court ruled that it was
not yet faced with the question of whether law-enforcement agents might conduct
themselves in such an outrageous manner as to violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment). Cf. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-91 (where the Court again
refused to find a due process violation, but also did not abandon the possibility
that one might occur under the proper facts.)
The lower federal appellate courts have also grappled with the issue. In
United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1359, 1361-1362 (9th Cir. 1976), the defendant
was convicted of conspiracy to illegally manufacture and distribute
methamphetamines. The court determined that no due process right violation oc-
curred where the police informant was the defendant's longtime friend, where the
friend helped to set up and operate the drug laboratory at defendant's direction,
and where defendant provided the drug formula. But see United States v. Twigg,
588 F.2d 373, 380-381 (3d Cir. 1978), (holding a due process violation occurred
where the government contacted the defendant who was not engaged in any ille-
gal conduct, implanted the criminal intent in his mind, provided the essential
supplies, and the government's agent controlled the laboratory as the laboratory
expert.) Compare with United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, 12-13 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that government involvement did not violate defendants due process
rights where government agents were highly involved in inducing defendants to
commit arson. The court questioned the continuing validity of Twiggs, yet main-
tained the present governmental conduct was subject to disapproval.) See also
United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 232 (1987). The court stated that "the due process channel which Russell
kept open is a most narrow one." Here, the court held, inter alia, that where the
FBI continued to use an informant for five months after learning that the sus-
pect-defendant and the informant were having sex on a regular basis, such con-
duct did not violate defendant's due process rights. Id. "Although we do not nec-
essarily condone this investigatory tactic, we hold that the governmental conduct
was not so shocking as to violate the due process clause." Id.
State courts are also willing to find due process violations. See State v.
Pooler, 255 N.W.2d 328, 330-331 (Iowa 1977), (the court stating in dictum, that
while a defendant may not have been entrapped, government conduct may violate
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trapment defense is not of constitutional origin or scope.23 As a
result, states are free to structure their own rules on the subject.
States also may decide whether to follow the inconsistency theory
or whether to adopt Mathews. A majority of states have chosen to
follow the inconsistency rule first announced on the state level in
People v. Murn237 and recently denounced in Mathews. 2 8 While
the trend in the state courts is toward Mathews,2 9 North Carolina
clings to the inconsistency rule as explained in State v. Neville.24
The North Carolina Supreme Court follows the majority view
of entrapment which places the primary focus upon the defend-
ant's predisposition to commit the crime.241 In State v. Luster, the
court stated the defense of entrapment by definition requires two
due process.) See also State v. Little, 121 N.H. 765, 435 A.2d 517 (1981). Some
courts may also base their decisions on their state constitution as the New York
courts have done in People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 519, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718,
378 N.E.2d 78, 82 (1978). "In this case, the police have simply gone too far." Id. at
523, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721, 378 N.E.2d at 84. But see State v. Tookes, 67 Haw. 608,
699 P.2d 983 (1985) (where the police agent, a civilian volunteer, actually had sex
with defendants and defendants were subsequently charged and convicted of
prostitution, the court held no denial of due process occurring. The court stated,
"While we question whether the police practices used in these cases are consistent
with the ethical standards which should guide law enforcement officials, we are
unwilling to rule that the acts which occurred constituted a breach of the bounds
of decency of constitutional magnitude.") Id. at 985.
236. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433; See also Dravo v. State, 46 Md. App. 622, 420
A.2d 1012 (1980); Little, 121 N.H. at -, 435 A.2d at 520.
237. 230 Mich. 555, 190 N.W. 666 (1922). See Groot, supra note 39, at 260.
238. Eleven states allow the defendant to deny the acts and plead entrap-
ment: Washington v. State, 755 P.2d 401 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); People v. Bar-
raza, 23 Cal.3d 675, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947 (1979); State v. Harrington,
332 So.2d 764 (La. 1976); People v. D'Angelo, 401 Mich. 167, 257 N.W.2d 655
(1977); State v. Branam, 161 N.J. Super. 53, 390 A.2d 1186, aff'd, 79 N.J. 301, 399
A.2d 299 (1978); People v. Johnston, 47 App. Div. 2d 897, 366 N.Y.S.2d 198
(1975); Hunnicutt v. State, 755 P.2d 105 (Okla. Crim. 1988); State v. McBride,
287 Or. 315, 599 P.2d 449 (1979); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 339 Pa. Super, 320,
488 A.2d 1144 (1985); State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979); and Hawthorne
v. State, 43 Wis.2d 82, 168 N.W.2d 85 (1969). One state has maintained in dictum
that a defendant should be allowed to deny the acts and plead entrapment. State
v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335 (Md. 1985).
239. At least two state courts have grounded their decisions in the reasoning
of Mathews. See Washington v. State, 755 P.2d 401 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) and
Hunnicutt v. State, 755 P.2d 105 (Okla. Crim. 1988).
240. 302 N.C. 623, 625-626, 276 S.E.2d 373, 375, aff'd 302 N.C. 623, 276
S.E.2d 373 (1981).
241. See State v. Salame, 24 N.C. App. 1, 10, 210 S.E.2d 77, 83 (1974), cert.
denied, 286 N.C. 429, 211 S.E.2d 800 (1975).
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elements:
(1) [A]cts of persuasion, trickery or fraud carried out by law
enforcement officers or their agents to induce a defendant to com-
mit a crime, (2) when the criminal design originated in the minds
of the government officials, rather than with the innocent defend-
ant, such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of
the law enforcement authorities.2 2
In the absence of evidence sufficient to show both elements, the
defendant will not be entitled to an entrapment defense instruc-
tion.243 North Carolina also follows the majority rule as to the typi-
cal manner of raising the entrapment defense which is through a
not-guilty plea.2 44 In addition, according to Neville, a defendant is
not entitled to raise the defense where he also denies committing
the acts charged.2 45
In Neville, a jury had convicted the defendant of possessing
with intent to sell and selling lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).2 "
At trial, the defendant denied ever possessing the drug, contending
to the contrary that all he did was to participate in a scheme
fabricated with intent to make the buyer (an undercover police of-
fice) believe the drugs came from the defendant when in reality an
informant bought them for resale.24 7 According to the State's evi-
dence, the defendant bought and resold the LSD.2  At the close of
the evidence, the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on entrap-
ment.2 49 The defendant appealed, alleging the trial judge erred in
his refusal.250 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.251 The defendant then appealed to the North Carolina
Supreme Court.
On appeal, the defendant conceded that the inconsistency rule
applied in North Carolina,25" but he argued that his defense was
242. 306 N.C. 566, 572, 295 S.E.2d 421, 424-425 (1982).
243. Id. See State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 27, 296 S.E.2d 433, 448 (1982)
(holding burden of proof rests with defendant to prove both elements.)
244. Luster, 306 N.C. at 581, 295 S.E.2d at 429 n.4. See supra note 77.
245. Neville, 302 N.C. at 626, 276 S.E.2d at 375
246. Id. at 624-25, 276 S.E.2d at 374
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. 49 N.C. App. 684, 272 S.E.2d 164 (1980).
252. The inconsistency rule has its roots in North Carolina case law in State
v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476 (1957). Without supporting authority, the
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consistent, relying on Henderson v. United States2 53 for author-
ity.2 54 The court correctly distinguished the fact patterns and held
the defendant's reliance misplaced. The defendant here denied the
charged acts, whereas in Henderson, the defendant admitted his
acts in operating an illegal distillery.25 5 Additionally, the court of-
fered as the primary rationale for denying the defendant his re-
quested instruction, the definitional reasoning offered by the gov-
ernment and dissenters in Mathews: "The defense of entrapment
presupposes the existence of the acts constituting the offense."256
Before concluding the opinion, the court approved exceptions
which will allow a defendant to deny the charged acts or mental
state and plead entrapment. Where the government's case raises
the issue of entrapment, the defendant may deny the acts and
plead entrapment.2 5 Also, a defendant may deny the intent ele-
ment in a charged offense but not the underlying acts.258 In conclu-
sion, the court apparently stated that because its research could
reveal no case which had allowed the requested defensive strategy,
it would also not allow the defense.259
The North Carolina Supreme Court's analysis parallels the
analysis used by the dissenters in Mathews and federal appellate
courts prior to Mathews with regard to the definitional argument.
The argument being when a defendant pleads entrapment he must
by definition have admitted to the charged acts underlying the of-
fense.260 However, the definitional argument cannot provide an ad-
equate basis for the inconsistency because: first, as a general rule
courts allow inconsistent defenses; and second, any apparent in-
consistency is technical in nature.61 In fact, North Carolina gener-
ally allows inconsistent defenses in criminal' cases,262 while the
court announced the rule. Id. at 85, 97 S.E.2d at 478. In a later case, the court
relied on Boles for the same proposition. State v. Swaney, 277 N.C. 602, 178
S.E.2d 399 (1971).
253. 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
254. Neville, 302 N.C. at 625-626, 276 S.E.2d at 374-375.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 626, 276 S.E.2d at 375.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 89-141 and 218 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 171-184 and 220-223 and accompanying text.
262. State v. Hayes, 88 N.C. App. 749, 364 S.E.2d 712 (1988) (where the
court allowed the defendant to plead self-defense and accident to a charge of sec-
ond-degree murder); see also State v. Walker, 34 N.C. App. 485, 238 S.E.2d 666
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North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provide for them in the
civil context. '63 Additionally, the court in Neville was willing to
permit a defendant to deny acts and plead entrapment when the
government's case forces the issue.264 How is that any different
than when the defendant's case raises the issue? If the evidence
raises the issue, regardless of whose evidence it is, the North Caro-
lina courts should allow the defendant to deny the acts and plead
entrapment as did the Mathews case. 63 Finally, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court's concluding remarks in Neville suggest that
the court ruled the way it did because it could find no contrary
supporting authority. 6 If that is the case, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court may confidently cite Mathews as authority for a new
North Carolina rule on the subject.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note attempted to relay the history of entrapment and
the inconsistency rule, explain the wisdom and flaws of the Ma-
thews opinion, and suggest that North Carolina should adopt the
Mathews rule. Before Mathews, the federal courts were divided on
the issue of when a defendant could plead entrapment. By a ten-
to-two count, the majority of courts would not allow the defendant
an instruction on entrapment when he had denied the acts under-
lying the charged offense. The alleged inconsistency coupled with
the policy reasons of preventing perjury and protecting the truth-
finding function of the courts compelled the majority's position.
Such reasoning also formed the basis of the state court decisions in
support of the inconsistency rule which still the majority view on
the state level. Mathews, however, has unified the federal courts
with a rule, contrary to the inconsistency rule, which operates to
allow the formally inconsistent pleadings where the evidence war-
rants. Though not compelled to follow the federal rule, North Car-
olina should adopt the Mathews holding. Indeed, the sound analy-
sis of Justice Rehnquist's opinion, combined with the North
Carolina Supreme Court's willingness in Neville to adopt a differ-
(1977), disc. rev. denied, 294 N.C. 445, 241 S.E.2d 847 (1978). Cf. State v. Silvers,
323 N.C. 646, 374 S.E.2d 858 (1989) (where the court reasoned that insanity and
voluntary intoxication defenses are not mutually exclusive).
263. N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
264. Neville, 302 N.C. at 626, 276 S.E.2d at 375.
265. Mathews, 108 S. Ct. at 889.
266. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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ent rule, should at the very least prompt North Carolina to take
another look towards revising its inconsistency rule.
George Robert Hicks, III
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